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Abstract
Deepfakes are videos that include changes, quite often
substituting face of a portrayed individual with a different
face using neural networks. Even though the technology
gained its popularity as a carrier of jokes and parodies it
raises a serious threat to ones security – via biometric im-
personation or besmearing. In this paper we present two
methods that allow detecting Deepfakes for a user with-
out significant computational power. In particular, we en-
hance MesoNet [3] by replacing the original activation
functions allowing a nearly 1% improvement as well as
increasing the consistency of the results. Moreover, we
introduced and verified a new activation function — Pish
that at the cost of slight time overhead allows even higher
consistency.
Additionally, we present a preliminary results of Deep-
fake detection method based on Local Feature Descrip-
tors (LFD), that allows setting up the system even faster
and without resorting to GPU computation. Our method
achieved Equal Error Rate of 0.28, with both accuracy and
recall exceeding 0.7.
1 Introduction
The progress in the field of machine learning, in particu-
lar deep neural networks, provided tools that automatize
tasks that previously required high skills and were highly
time–consuming. One of such tasks is manipulation of fa-
cial image, which was earlier possible to perform only by
a skilled person, using specialized software. Nowadays,
thanks to the Deepfake technology it is possible to create
face manipulation videos, on a level of detail unachieve-
able before, without any sophisticated requirements.
Creation of Deepfake forgeries requires facial images
of two persons — the individual present on the source
material and the victim — person whose face will be
added to the video. Using these two sets, two autoen-
coders are trained in order to reconstruct the appropriate
face — in result getting expression and illumination of
the victim, while keeping facial features of the first per-
son. Recently, more sophisticated versions of Deepfakes
were introduced, with utilization of Generative Adversar-
ial (GAN) networks [9], enhancing the level of detail pos-
sible to achieve. Easy and open access to such technolo-
gies leads to many threats that concern various spheres of
people’s lives. Deepfakes can be used to synthesize be-
smearing videos, very often of a pornographic nature. Ar-
tificially created fake–news videos, so dangerous in these
times, can depict a public figure saying or doing things
that might harm their reputation or cause crisis. In ad-
dition, the possibility of forging a video in a transparent
way undermines the validity of the strength of recordings
used as the evidence in courts of law. Naturally, during
trials one can be cleared of charged, after detailed exam-
ination of the video, yet the process is time–consuming
and in the case of public figures, the trust of general opin-
ion may be irreparably tarnished. In such cases a quick
and easy method, that allows one to determine whether
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the movie is legitimate, cannot be overstated. Provid-
ing methods that allow Deepfake detection without sig-
nificant computational power and without delay is even
more important, due to increase in remote communica-
tion, including financial and clerical matters. Addition-
ally, Deepfakes can influence the performance of biomet-
ric identification methods, providing false positives. The
problem is relevant especially in the face of regulations
like PSD2 [2] that may lead to using video conferences as
a method of bank client identification.
State–of–the–art Deepfake detection models based on
deep neural networks provide results that may be used in
the court of law to examine video evidence. However,
their high computational cost makes them unavailable
for an individual user. Typically, such scenarios are
handled by the use of external services which examine
the uploaded data, yet due to highly controversial nature
of these videos and costs such external services may not
be suitable for everyone wanting to verify the news or
clear their name. Notably, there are other architectures
like MesoNet [3], which despite not providing cutting
edge results, are good enough to allow an average citizen
to have an access to a tool that allows to determine the
legitimacy of the material.
Due to the fact that modern Deepfake solutions utilize
deep neural networks, one of their main components that
highly influences final performance, is an activation func-
tion.
By following linear transformation in the neuron, acti-
vation function allows neural networks to map non–linear
nature of the data. One of most widely used activation
functions are ReLU and LeakyReLU [8, 21] — both used
in MesoNet. Their main advantages include simplicity,
yet the effectiveness might be improved.
In the paper we focus on detecting Deepfake videos in
a fast and reliable manner, so that users may, on their own,
determine whether the presented recording is legitimate,
or provide a proof that they became victim of besmearing
video, before the damage to the reputation spreads. We in-
vestigate the influence of the activation functions used in
known architectures as well as using a different approach.
Our contribution In this paper we present a compari-
son of the performances achieved by MesoNet Deepfake
detection model when trained using different activation
functions. Moreover, we present and describe a new ac-
tivation function — Pish. Furthermore, we show, that the
initial performance can be increased by using other func-
tions. In addition, we compare the performance of Pish
with state–of–the–art solutions using well–known neural
networks like SqueezeNet [12], DenseNet [11] and Effi-
cientNet [28]. Finally, we show promising results of pre-
liminary experiment concerning use of two local feature
descriptors (ORB [26] and BRISK [18]) that were previ-
ously not taken into account in the task of Deepfake de-
tection.
2 Previous work
The proposed approaches to Deepfake detection come
from various fields, many of them based mainly on com-
puter vision methods like frequency analysis [7] where
authors look for marginal inconsistencies, local feature
descriptors [4] or head pose estimation [30] exploiting im-
age inconsistencies, when frontal face is embedded into
tilted head. The others utilized deep neural networks —
most often performing transfer–learning like XceptionNet
[6, 25]. Using this solution allowed to achieve a total ac-
curacy on low quality samples of 0.7010, however uti-
lizing significant computational power. A different ap-
proach, has been presented in [3], where the authors pro-
vided a relatively shallow architecture, that allows train-
ing and verification of the suspected video, with signifi-
cantly lower resources required, yet at the cost of accu-
racy resulting in total accuracy at the level of 0.66. More
details on MesoNet is presented in Sect. 4. A novel ap-
proach, avoiding the usage of deep learning methods, has
been presented in [4]. The authors utilize Local Feature
Descriptors(LFD) in order to localize inconsistencies in
the video. The paper showed only preliminary results,
hence only a part of the popular descriptors was evaluated
and the results were not paramount with Equal Error Rate
going as high as 0.7 and 0.98 False Rejection Rate with
a False Acceptance rate of 0.1. However, tested on var-
ious kinds of manipulations, the results of LFD showed
greater performance than methods like [15] in the case of
low quality Deepfakes. For broader analysis of Deepfake
detection methods, their vulnerabilities and the datasets
used one can refer to [23, 20].
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Recent years were also the time of the improvement in
the field of activation functions. One of the recently intro-
duced solutions, Mish [22], showed an increase in accu-
racies when compared to most of the baseline solutions.
3 Activation functions
Many different activation functions were introduced
throughout recent years. Some of them showed a progress
in relation to their predecessor. However, they have not
replaced baseline solutions as their superiority was not
universal enough. This has partially changed with the in-
troduction of two activation functions — Swish [24] and
Mish [22]. They were evaluated on many various prob-
lems and most of the time outperformed baseline solu-
tions.
Figure 1: Pish activation function and its derivative
Pish (Fig. 1) is a new function proposed by us, whose
properties were inspired by the state of the art func-
tions like Swish and Mish. It is defined by f (x) =
x · arctan(softplus(x)+ sigmoid(x)), where softplus(x) =
ln(1+ ex) and sigmoid(x) = 11+e−x . It is a smooth and
non–monotonic function, it is characterized by a shift
in values near 0. Values of Pish are bounded from be-
low and unbounded at the top, with a range of values
of [≈ −0.56,+∞). Note that the function is continuous,
with a smooth derivative f ′(x) =
x
(
e−x
(e−x+1)2 +
ex
(1+ex)
)(
1
e−x+1+log(1+e
x)
)2
+1
+
tan−1
( 1
e−x+1 + log(1+ e
x)
)
. Its performance, together
with other aforementioned functions, has been tested on
datasets like MesoNet Deepfake detection dataset, Fash-
ion MNIST and CIFAR–10. Note that it is slightly
more computationally demanding than the aforemen-
tioned functions (cf. Sect. 6), yet shows signs of higher
consistency.
4 MesoNet
MesoNet is an architecture of convolutional neural net-
work proposed in [3] that comes in two variants —
Meso—4 and MesoInception–4. Based on an input im-
age, the network determines if presented facial image is
either Deepfake manipulated or pristine.
Meso–4 begins with 4 blocks, each consisting of a con-
volutional layer with ReLU activation function, batch nor-
malization and ending with max–pooling layer. They are
followed by a fully–connected layer of 16 neurons with a
dropout and ultimate neuron determining validity of an
image. MesonInception–4 comes with inception mod-
ules [27] in place of two first blocks.
The solution is shallow in comparison to other ar-
chitectures like ResNet–50 [10] or XceptionNet [6]
that are commonly used in Deepfake detection task.
MesoNet solution comes with the number of 27.977 and
28.615 trainable parameters for respectively Meso–4 and
MesoInception–4 variants whereas ResNet–50 is com-
posed of over 23.5 million parameters. Such difference
allows using MesoNet in an environment that does not
provide resources needed for the other architectures and
determine the legitimacy of the video in shorter time.
The dataset used by Afchar et al. was self–collected.
It was composed of batches of frames containing differ-
ent individuals. The dataset consisted of 12353 training
(5103 fake, 7250 pristine) and 7104 test (2845 fake, 4259
pristine) samples.
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5 Deepfake detection experiments
MesoInception–4 utilizes two activation functions —
ReLU, in inception and convolution modules and Leaky
ReLU in fully connected layer. The comparison included
ReLU, Leaky ReLU (following the original, the coeffi-
cient used was equal to 0.1), Mish, Swish and Pish. In or-
der to determine the influence of various activation func-
tions, in particular Pish, on the performance of Deepfake
detection with MesoInception–4 network we performed
exhaustive tests. Activations were used in two slots —
the first function was in both inception and convolution
modules and the other one was after a fully–connected
layer. The authors of [3] have provided the code base that
contained networks’ implementation, as well as their pre-
trained weights. For a fair comparison we used, the same
parameters whenever they were specified. The input data
was of size 256×256×3; the optimization was performed
using Adam optimizer [14]. In addition, training process
used a batch size of 75 samples and an adjustable learning
rate that decreased every 1000 steps by the factor of ten
from 10−3 down to 10−6.
Training data underwent data augmentation process in-
cluding zoom, flips, rotations and color appearance pa-
rameter adjustments. Data augmentation details, as well
as the number of epochs, were selected by us in the course
of the experiment.
The comparison used the dataset provided by Afchar et
al. As no validation set was explicitly separated, it has
been extracted by use of 10% of training images.
This process was done with the respect to the scenes
— in order to prevent data leakage whole scenes were
moved.
We divided the experiments into 3 stages. First of
them concerned training each combination of activation
functions pairs (36 different models) for 50 epochs,
This value was selected in order to achieve comparable
computation time to estimated by Afchar et.al.Using
50 epochs corresponded to 2–3 hours of training time
on consumer grade GPU. Each epoch used all training
samples and was ended with a validation of the current
state of the network using the whole validation set. To
make sure that the results are reproducible, the stage was
repeated on various data splits.
The next stage of the experiment was done in or-
der to give more details about the efficacy of functions
when trained using different learning rates, a common
test which was incorporated in works like [24, 22]. We
investigated best 5 combinations from the previous stage
together with the one originally used in the paper. Func-
tions were trained using decreasing learning rates starting
with 10−2, 10−3 and 10−4. This resulted in the final rates
of correspondingly 10−5, 10−6 and 10−7. Each of the 18
models was trained once again on three different splits to
provide more reliable results.
The number of training epochs was another detail
that differed from the previous stage. Instead of running
a training for a fixed number of epochs, process was
terminated if the validation accuracy has not improved
for three epochs. This aimed to ensure that a model will
generalize well and avoid overfitting.
The final stage of the experiment was performed on
5 models that provided the best results in the 2nd stage.
Training concerned whole training set, the hyperparame-
ters were selected on the basis of previous stages. Models
were later tested on testing set. To ensure reliability, pro-
cess was repeated 5 times using a random data split with
a condition of moving whole scene to a single set.
6 Results
Results from the first stage clearly showed the increase
in the case of newer activation functions. 13 out of 36
functions’ combinations (denoted as convolution activa-
tion + fully connected activation e.g. ReLU + Mish) pro-
vided better performance than the baseline pair ReLU +
Leaky ReLU. This fact does not particularly implies that
these standard functions should be omitted — the maxi-
mum validation accuracy was achieved by ReLU + Swish
pair (0.9253). Pish was also present among top results
— both in the place of convolution, as well as, the fully
connected layers. The increase in the performance due to
usage of Mish function was clearly visible. It was present
in the half of the best 10 results, and four out of five best
scores.
The best 5 of the combinations with respect to valida-
tion accuracy were selected for the next stage — namely
ReLU + Swish, Pish + Mish, Mish + Mish, Swish + Mish,
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Mish + Swish and ReLU + Leaky ReLU.
Combination LR Val. Acc. Epochs
Mish + Mish 10−2 0.8800 16
Pish + Mish 10−3 0.8547 10
ReLU + Leaky ReLU 10−3 0.8447 11
ReLU + Swish 10−3 0.8375 9
Swish + Mish 10−3 0.8372 10
Mish + Swish 10−3 0.8331 10
Mish + Mish 10−3 0.8292 10
Swish + Mish 10−2 0.8289 7
Mish + Swish 10−4 0.8289 26
ReLU + Swish 10−2 0.8097 11
Table 1: Maximum validation accuracies scored by the
models trained using given learning rates (LR) in the sec-
ond stage. The epoch number is an average of training
durations of all 3 runs.
Table 1 shows 10 best models from the second stage
along with their maximum validation accuracies and av-
erage number of epochs. Five of them were selected for
the final stage.
Model (Learning Rate) Accuracy Test Accuracy
Swish + Mish (0.001) 0.9106 0.8718
Pish + Mish (0.001) 0.9013 0.8689
ReLU + Leaky ReLU (0.001) 0.9052 0.8676
Mish + Mish (0.01) 0.9193 0.8601
ReLU + Swish (0.001) 0.9252 0.8403
Table 2: Accuracies of the best models from the third
stage.
Table 2 contains results of mentioned models. Training
accuracies were taken from the final epoch. The best test
accuracy was achieved by the combination of Swish and
Mish — it was equal to 0.8718. Second best performance
was achieved by Pish + Mish. Combination originally
used by Afchar et al., ReLU + LeakyRelu, was charac-
terized by a slightly worse performance — 0.8676.
As mentioned earlier, Afchar et al. provided pretrained
weights of their architectures — these models were also
evaluated in the course of the experiment. They achieved
the accuracies of 0.9513 and 0.9131 respectively for train-
ing and testing sets. These values differ from the ones
the ones presented in Table 2. The reason behind that
are mainly the differences between training processes. As
some of the details like number of epochs or types and de-
grees of augmentations were not provided, we could not
exactly reproduce their training procedure.
Our evaluation process covered not only the perfor-
mance of activation function but also times of inference.
Treating ReLU + ReLU as a baseline, we obtained +2.2%
for Swish, +2.3% for Leaky ReLU, +4.3% for Mish, and
+7.5% for Pish. Note that, since [3] did not provide the
exact time requirements of their training and inference,
hence we need to treat those as a reference.
Described experiment shows that use of newer activa-
tion functions can indeed improve the performance of the
neural network. New activation function introduced in
this paper — Pish, achieved results that were comparable
to state–of–the–art functions.
Despite being slightly more demanding in the terms of
required computations, the provided results showed that
it is a promising and reliably consistent alternative to the
existing solutions and that it is worth to explore further its
characteristics.
7 Additional Pish tests
In [22], aside from proposing Mish activation function,
extensive tests and benchmarks were provided in the re-
lated repository [1]. The following section contains the
result gathered from four of these benchmarks that were
later used to compare Pish with well–known activation
functions.
7.1 Various depths of the neural network
First test aimed to give information about the performance
of neural network in relation to its depth. The architec-
tures used in the benchmark differed only in the number
of fully connected layers. The only difference between the
benchmark used in [22] and the one presented in the paper
was the dataset used — instead on MNIST [17], activation
functions were evaluated on Fashion MNIST dataset [29].
Both sets consist of 60,000 training and 10,000 test gray–
scale images of size 28× 28. However, samples from
Fashion MNIST contain more degrees of freedom making
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it more difficult. Moreover, due to various textures and in-
tensity changes as well as actually appearing in Deepfake
videos, the clothing from Fashion MNIST seem more rel-
evant than the digits from MNIST.
Each network started with two convolutional layers,
followed by a max pooling with a dropout of rate 25%.
It was followed by a number of fully connected layers of
500 neurons with batch normalization and dropout (once
again 25%). The quantity of layers depended on the
parameter which was from range from 15 to 25. Final
layer of the network was composed of output neurons us-
ing softmax activation function. Both convolutional and
fully–connected layers used the currently evaluated acti-
vation function. Discussed benchmark was performed us-
ing ReLU, Swish, Mish and Pish functions. The optimizer
utilized was stochastic gradient descent (SGD), all runs
used the same learning rate with a batch size of 128. We
ran the process for 50 epochs, similarly to the experiment
described in Sect. 5.
Figure 2: Maximum test accuracy in relation to the depth
of the neural network. Plot generated using a script
from [1].
Figure 2 shows test accuracies of aforementioned ac-
tivation functions. Presented results are the maximum
test accuracies scored for each consecutive number of lay-
ers. Note that, the values remained similar for the smaller
number of layers. As their number increased, so had the
differences between functions’ performance. While the
differences are not big, Pish achieves the best test accu-
racy in the case of almost all network’s depths.
7.2 SqueezeNet
The second benchmark concerned evaluation of popular
architecture SqueezeNet [12].
Described process was performed using CIFAR–
10 [16], a dataset composed of 60,000 samples of size
of 32×32 divided equally into 10 classes. All activation
functions (ReLU, Mish, Swish and Pish) were trained for
100 epochs using the same parameters — batch size of
128 and a learning rate equal of 10−3. Process was re-
peated 3 times to ensure the reliability of the results.
Activation function Top–1 accuracy
Swish 0.8874
Pish 0.8860
Mish 0.8845
ReLU 0.8784
Table 3: Top–1 test accuracies of SqueezeNet neural net-
work trained on CIFAR–10 dataset
Table 3 contains top–1 test accuracies of SqueezeNet
trained using ReLU, Mish, Swish and Pish functions.
Models were evaluated after each epoch — presented val-
ues are the maximum achieved by each of the networks.
The results of the well known functions are as ex-
pected. ReLU function provided smallest accuracy, about
0.01 less than the other functions, which is a typical out-
come confirmed by many benchmarks. Meanwhile, re-
sults of Mish and Swish are close, respectively 0.8874 and
0.8844 — as stated in the original Mish paper, there are
cases when Mish function performs slightly worse than
the other one. The second best score, 0.8860, belonged to
Pish.
7.3 Other architectures
Pish has been also tested on other architectures like Effi-
cientNet [28] and DenseNet [11]. Their evaluation pro-
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cedures were similar to the one described in Sect. 7.2 —
models were trained on CIFAR–10 dataset. ReLU, Mish,
Swish and Pish scored maximally respectively 0.8026,
0.8043, 0.8035, 0.7875 for EfficientNet and 0.9103,
0.9112, 0.9132, 0.9089 for DenseNet.
8 Local Feature Descriptors
Akhtar et al. in their paper [4] showed their preliminary
results of detecting Deepfake manipulation with the use
of local feature descriptors.
The following section contains results of our prelim-
inary comparison between two of the methods from [4]
and two descriptors which were not previously investi-
gated in the field of Deepfake detection.
Presented experiment was performed on the subset of
FaceForensics++ dataset [25]. It was composed of 150
original and 150 corresponding Deepfake videos. 80%
of movies were used in training set, whereas the rest was
used in test. Training was run on each frame extracted
from every video.
Classification between pristine and manipulated sam-
ples was done with images’ keypoints. They were ob-
tained using SIFT [19], SURF [5], ORB [26] and BRISK
[18] feature descriptors — latter two were not covered in
the original work. The procedure used, was inspired by
the approach utilized by Akhtar et al., however the fol-
lowing experiment was created using our own implemen-
tation. This led to some differences between these two ap-
proaches. In our experiments each feature descriptor used
only its coordinates and angles creating feature vectors of
128 values, moreover we decided to use more common
dataset — FaceForensics++.
The pipeline worked as follows — it started with lo-
calization of the face using Dlib face detector [13]. The
basis of its bounding boxes image was cropped and later
normalized to the size of 200×200. Next step concerned
keypoints’ extraction. We used only information about
their coordinates and angle. In order to further normal-
ize the data, whole frame was split into 16 equally sized
chunks (4×4). Each keypoint was assigned to the appro-
priate chunk basing on its coordinates. Each of the chunks
was later converted into a histogram of 8 bins. The as-
signment was done using the angles of the points (first 45
degrees were moved to the first bin, and so on). This re-
sulted in a vector of 128 values — 8 bins for each of the
16 chunks. Such data was later used in classification. In
order to make solution simple, we utilized support vector
machine with no hyperparameter optimization.
Descriptor Accuracy Recall EER
SIFT [4] [LQ] - - 0.5710
SURF [4] [LQ] - - 0.4546
SIFT [4] [HQ] - - 0.5758
SURF [4] [HQ] - - 0.6726
SURF 0.6105 0.5996 0.3917
SIFT 0.6742 0.6314 0.3395
ORB 0.7059 0.6754 0.3059
BRISK 0.7279 0.7012 0.2836
Table 4: Results achieved by the feature descriptors
method on a subset of FaceForensics++ dataset. Note that
referenced results did not provide Accuracy and Recall,
the authors used a different dataset as well.
Table 4 contains test results achieved by the aforemen-
tioned feature descriptors. Just like in the case of Akhtar
et al. we treated each frame as a distinct sample — other
frames of the video were not taken into account when test-
ing a single sample. In a spirit of detecting Deepfakes,
we treated manipulated samples as positives and pristine
as negatives. The use of BRISK and ORB methods con-
tributed to the improvement of all metrics. The change of
feature descriptor has increased the accuracies from about
9 to 12% in case of SURF and from 3 to 5% in case of
BRISK.
Time comparison with MesoNet. Since our main goal
is to provide an efficient, yet fast method of Deepfake
detection, performable on office–grade PCs, our evalua-
tion process has also included the time evaluation of both
training and inference of MesoNet and local feature de-
scriptors approaches. As two solutions were trained on
different datasets, we compared their training times by
running this procedure once again on MesoNet training
set which consisted of about 12.500 images. MesoNet’s
model was trained for 10 epochs, as this quantity con-
tributed to the satisfying results. Time measurement of
LFD–based approach took into consideration both feature
extraction (creation of feature vectors) and training of the
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SVM classifier.
Training process of MesoNet network on this dataset
took about 30 minutes on consumer grade GPU, whereas
LFD approach required about 3.5 minutes without GPU,
utilizing only the CPU (60% of this time was required to
convert frames into feature vectors using feature descrip-
tors). Inference based on an average of 5000 predictions
was equal to respectively 0.034 seconds for MesoNet
and 0.076 for LFD. The reason behind greater time of
descriptor–based approach was preprocessing which con-
verted images to feature vectors taking about 98% of in-
ference time.
9 Conclusion
In the paper we focus on Deepfake detection, that be-
comes a serious threat to the privacy and biometric secu-
rity. We put particular interest in providing a methods of
detecting Deepfakes that are feasible for consumer grade
devices, so that anyone can verify, with reasonable prob-
ability, whether the video is legitimate. Our contribution
is twofold – we investigated the efficacy of a shallow neu-
ral network MesoNet, with various activation functions.
Aside experimental verification of previously introduced
function, we presented a novel one – Pish, that achieves
results competitive to top-performing ones, yet with high
consistency. Using MesoNet with Pish and Mish activa-
tion functions allowed us to achieve 0.8689 test accuracy,
with only Swish and Mish combination outperforming it
(over 0.87) and the baseline combination (ReLU+Leaky
ReLU) trailing with 0.8676. The other part of the con-
tribution is an extension of Deepfake detection method
based on local feature descriptors. Due to using loca-
tion and angle of BRISK features we obtained Equal Error
Rate of 0.28. In the future work, we plan to focus on ex-
panding the LFD–based methods, to achieve lower EER,
as well as further lowering time and computation require-
ments of the Deepfake detection.
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